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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Over twenty years ago, this Court rejected Petitioner's argument that his sentencing
proceedings were constitutionally defective because the jury played no role in them. State v.

Stuart, 110 Idaho 163,715 P.2d 833, reh'g denied (Idahol986). In 2002, the United States
Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). Vindicated in principle by Ring,
Petitioner sought vindication in practice by filing in the court below a petition for postconviction
relief and a motion to correct his illegal sentence. Relying on this Court's decision in State v.

Hoffman, 142 Idaho 27, 121 P.3d 958 (Idaho 2005), and finding that Petitioner's conviction and
sentence were final before the Ring decision, the court summarily dismissed the petition. In

Ifoffman, the Court denied Ring relief based on its understanding that states are bound to follow
federal retroactivity doctrine when the new rule in question is exclusively federal in nature.
However, earlier this year, the Supreme Court held that states may apply a new federal rule to a
broader range of cases than is allowed by federal retroactivity doctrine. Danforth v. Minnesota,
128 S.Ct. 1029, 1035 (2008).

ISSUE ON APPEAL
Whether, under the settled Idaho three-part test for determining the extent to which a new
court decision retroactively applies, Ring must be applied in Petitioner's case.

ARGUMENT

Citing to State v. Hoffman, 142 Idaho 27, 121 P.3d 958 (Idaho 2005), the court below
granted the State's motion to summarily dismiss Mr. Stuart's $2719 petition and Rule 35 motion
I

seeking sentencing relief pursuant to Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). In light of Danforth,
this case should be remanded for Ring to be applied in the court below.

I.

APPLYING THIS COURT'S LONG ESTABLISHED THREE-FACTOR TEST
FOR RETROACTIVITY DETERMINATIONS SHOWS THAT FULL
RETROACTIVITY MUST BE EXTENDED TO RING.
A.

This Court Has Never Wavered In Its Adherence To Its Three-Pronged Test
For Determining The Retroactive Effect Of New Judicially Created Rules.

This Court has long used a three factor balancing test to determine the extent to which a
judicial decision may be retroactively applied. As the Court has noted:
The usual rule is that decisions of this Court apply retroactively to
all past and pending cases. State v. Tipton, 99 Idaho 670, 587 P.2d
305 (1978). For policy reasons, however, this Court has discretion
to limit the retroactive application of a particular decision. We inay
hold that it does not apply even to the case in which the decision
was announced; or that it applies only to that case and not to other
past or pending cases; or that it applies to both that case and
pending cases, but not to past cases. Jones v. Watson, 98 Idaho
606, 570 P.2d 284 (1977). When deciding whether to limit the
retroactive application of a decision, we weigh three factors: (1) the
purpose of the decision; (2) the reliance upon the prior law; and (3)
the effect upon the administration of justice if the decision is
applied retroactively. Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19,523 P.2d
1365 (1974). We balance the first factor against the other two to
determine whether to limit the retroactive application of the
decision. Jones v. Watson, 98 Idaho 606,570 P.2d 284 (1977).

BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, 141 Idaho 168, 108 P.3d 3 15 (Idaho 2004).

B.

Application Of The Three Part Retroactivity Test To Ring.

1.

The Purpose of Ring v. Arizona.

The aim of this factor is to assess the extent to which the decision's purpose "would be
served by applying the case to both past and future actions." Thompson at 25, 1371. Put
alternatively, the aim is to assess the extent to which the failure to apply a decision retroactively
"would ...thwart[]" its purpose. Gay v. County Commisioners ofBonneville County, 103 Idaho
626,631,651 P.2d 560, 565 (Idaho 1982).
The narrow holding of Ring is that, as a matter of Sixth Amendment law, "[clapital
defendants, no less than noncapital defendants, ...are entitled to a jury determination of any fact
on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment." Ring at 588 &
589. Thus, the narrow purpose of Ring is to ensure that criminal case juries are accorded their
constitutionally mandated role as fact finders, regardless of whether the defendant might face the
prospect of a death sentence or, instead, some sentence less than death. This straight-forward
purpose would obviously be served by giving Ring full retroactive effect. If it is not applied
retroactively to all cases, then those defendants denied its benefits will remain under a sentence
for which they were found eligible on the basis of facts determined not by a jury but by a judge.
Put differently, those defendants denied the benefit of Ring will remain illegally sentenced to
death because tliey were found death-eligible by a judge.'

'A year ago, this assertion would have been controversial in light of ethereal questions
surrounding retroactivity doctrine such as whether "new" constitutional rules of criminal
procedure have always existed and newly discovered over time or, alternatively, whether they are
judicial creations. Danforth, however, has resolved such questions as a matter of law.
[Tlhe source of a "new rule" is the Constitution itself, not any
judicial power to create new rules of law. Accordingly, the

In addition to the Sixth Amendment's jury trial provision guaranteeing individual
defendants the right to a jury trial, it had a second rationale imported from common law. This
additional aim was to invest the general population with the means to prevent government
overreaching and government by tyranny.
Juries, guaranteed in no fewer than three amendments, were at
the heart of the Bill of Rights. The Fifth Amendment safeguarded
the role of the grand jury; the Sixth, the criminal petit jury; and the
Seventh, the civil jury.
Spanning both civil and criminal proceedings, the jury played a
leading role in protecting ordinary individuals against
governmental overreaching. Jurors would be drawn from the
community; like the militia they were ordinary citizens, not
permanent government officials on the government payroll. Just as
the militia could check a paid professional standing army, the jury
could thwart overreaching bv..
powerful and ambitious prosecutors
and judges. In the words of one Anti-Federalist pamphlet, "Judges,
unincumbered by- "juries, have been ever found much better friends
to government than to the people. Such judges will always be
more desirable than juries to [would-be tyrants,] upon the same
principle that a large standing army . . . is ever desirable to those
who wish to enslave the people." Thus Madison proposed a jury
amendment in language reminiscent of the Second amendment's
ode to the militia-"the trial by jury, as one of the best securities to
the rights of the people, ought to remain inviolatee'-and a leading
Anti-Federalist described jurors as "centinels and guardians" of
"the people."

-

....
[TJhe criminal petit jury could interpose itself on behalf of the
people's right by refusing to convict when the executive sought to
trump up charges against its political critics (as in the Zenger
underlying right necessarily pre-exists our articulation of the new
rule. What we are actually determining when we assess the
"retroactivity" of a new rule is not the temporal scope of a newly
announced right, but whether a violation of the right that occurred
prior to the announcement of the new rule will entitle a criminal
defendant to the relief sought.

Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S.Ct. 1029,1035 (2008)

case[']). Once again, more than a permanent government
official-even an independent Article I11judge-was required to
safeguard liberty. In England, judges had at times abetted
government tyranny, as the case of Prynne and the infamous
"Bloody Assizes" of Judge George Jeffreys in the 1680s illustrated.
Even in america, federal judges would be appointed by the central
government and might prove reluctant to rein in their former
benefactors and current paymasters-as illustrated by the brazenly
partisan conduct of some Federalist judges during the Sedition Act
controversy.
As Tocqueville observed, the overall jury system was
fundamentally populist and majoritarian: "The institution of the
jury . . . palces the real direction of society in the hands of the
governed, . . . and not in that of the government. . . . [It] invests the
people, or that class of citizens with the direction of society. . . . the
jury system as it is understood in America appears to me to be as
direct and as extreme a consequence of the sovereignty of the
people as universal suffrage. They are two instruments of equal
power, which contribute to the supremacy of the majority.>> [FN]
[FN-] 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY
N
94 (Phillips Brandley ed., Vintage 1945).

293-

Akhil Amar, THE BLL OF RIGHTS83-8 (1998).
The purpose of the jury as a place for the citizenry's civic involvement did not end with
the ratification of the Bill of Rights. On the contrary, the Supreme Court has comparatively
recently sounded that theme in its fair jury selection decisions. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79 (1986), the Supreme Court held that, "The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends
beyond...the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community. Selection

Z"Colonialgrand juries flexed their muscles to resist unpopular prosecutions. In the
1730s, two successive New York grand juries had refused to indict the popular publisher John
Peter Zenger-and when the government instead proceeded by information, the petit jury
famously acquitted. (One of the articles for which Zenger was prosecuted had featured an attack
on new York Governor cosby for having engaged in personal litigation tactics that sought to
evade ihe right to jury trial in civil cases.)" AKHILAMAR,THEBLI, OIi RIGI~TS
84-5 (1998).

procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public confidence in
the fairness of our system ofjustice." Id at 87. A few years later, in holding that defendants
have standing to object to the prosecution's illegally striking members of a cognizable group
even where the defendants themselves do not belong to that group, the Supreme Court explained:
The opportunity for ordinary citizens to participate in the
administration of justice has long- been recognized
as one of the
principal justifications for retaining the jury system. . . . In Balzac
v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922), Chief Justice Taft wrote for
the Court:
[Tlhe jury system postulates a conscious duty of
participation in the machinery of justice. . . . One of
its greatest benefits is in the security it gives the
people that they, as jurors actual or possible, being
part of the judicial system of the country can
prevent its arbitrary use or abuse.

Jury service preserves the democratic element of the law, as it
guards the rights of the parties and ensures continued acceptance of
the laws by all of the people. . .Indeed, with the exception of
voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is
their most significant opportunity to participate in the democratic
process.
The jury acts as a vital check against the wrongful exercise of
power by the State and its prosecutors. Ratson, 476 U.S. at 86.

. ...

The purpose of the jury system is to impress upon the criminal
defendant and the community as a whole that a verdict of
conviction or acquittal is given in accordance with the law by
persons who are fair. The verdict will not be accepted or
understood in these tenns if the jury is chosen by unlawful means
at the outset.

Powers v. Ohio,499 U.S. 400,406,407,411, & 413 (1991).

This Sixth Amendment jury guarantee purpose as an effort to preclude government
overreaching and tyranny would also be served by giving Ring full retroactive application. The
choice whether to seek the death penalty in any particular case is discretionary and the process by
which those decisions are made is notoriously opaque. Decisions to seek death are fueled by
political elections. "The 'higher authority' to whom present-day capital judges may be 'too
I

responsive' is a political climate in which judges who covet higher office -or who merely wish
to remain judges -must constantly profess their fealty to the death penalty . . . . The danger that

I

they will bend to political pressures when pronouncing sentence in highly publicized capital
cases is the same danger confronted by judges beholden to King George 111." Zlavris v. Alabama,

I

513 U.S. 504, 519 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (omitting footnote with citations to newspaper
articles as support for the proposition that the political climate requires viable judicial and
legislative candidates to strongly and clearly support the death penalty). "Although the Code of
Judicial Conduct practically requires judicial candidates to keep their campaign pronouncements

I
vacuous and boring, candidates for state and local prosecuting offices face no comparable
restraints. . . .The practice of prosecutorial candidates' campaigning on capital convictions or
executions is not hypothetical." Kenneth Bresler, Seeking Justice, Seeking Eleciion, and Seeking

The Death Penalty. The Ethics of Prosecuto~ialCandidates' Campaigning on Capital
Convictions, 7 Geo. L.J. 941,941-2 & 945 (1994). See also James S. Liebman, The
Overproduction of Death, 100 Colum. L.R. 2030 (2000) (arguing that various institutional actors,
including police prosecutors, and judges, have strong incentives to "overproduce" death
sentences, relative to the number that would be appropriate based solely on substantive law) and
Stephen B. Bright and Patrick J. Keenan, Judges And The Politics OfDeath: Deciding Between

The Bill Of Rights And The Next Judicial Election In Capital Cases, 75 Boston U. L.R. 759
(1995) (discussing how political pressures on elected judges result in incentives favoring
punitiveness in high-profile capital cases). Juries serve as a bulwark against prosecutorial
overreaching by seeking the death penalty in cases where it should not be sought. As well, juries
are not susceptible to the political pressures under which judges and prosecuting attorneys labor.
Justice Ginsberg has noted, "I have yet to see a death case, among the dozens coming to
the Supreme Court on eve of execution petitions, in which the defendant was well represented at
trial." Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, In Pursuit of the Public Good: Luwyers Who Care, Lecture
at the David A. Clarke School of Law, University of the District of Columbia (Apr. 9, 2001)
(available at http://www.superemecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/spUO4-O9-Ola.html). It is
generally accepted that poor funding is a key explanation for the poor lawyering seen in death
penalty cases. "[Vlirt~~ally
every person sentenced to death could be classified as 'poor."' Mary
Welek Atwell, EVOLVING
STANDARDS
OF DECENCY,
35 (2004). See Stephen B. Bright, Will the

Dealh Penalty Remain Alive in the Twenty-First Century?:International Norms, discrimination,
Arbitrariness, and the Risk of Executing the Innocent, 2001 Wis. L.R. 16 ("Throughout history,
the death penalty has been reserved almost exclusively for those who are poor. The major
consequence of poverty is being represented by a court-appointed lawyer who may lack the skill,
resources, and, in some cases, even the inclination to provide a competent defense.") & Counsel

for the Poor: the Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 Yale
L.J. 1835 (1994) (discussing the intimate connection between available money for lawyers' fees
and the quality of lawyering).

The Sixth Amendment jury guarantee's aim to prevent governmental abuses would be
furthered by the full retroactive application of Ring
2.

Reliance on Pre-Ring Law.

Generally, the Court considers this factor as a query into the extent to which litigants and
courts generally have relied on the earlier rule.3 The more litigants and courts used that earlier
rule, the greater the reliance. In Thompson, for example, the decision whose retroactivity was at
issue invalidated a statute's precluding negligence lawsuits by automobile guests against their
hosts. The Court found the reliance factor there very strong because "[tlhe possibility exists that
I

hosts may have offered rides to guests relying on the protection of the guest statute from
negligence actions. Additionally, insurance companies may have relied upon the guest statute in
setting their rates." Id at 25, 1371. Thus, the greater the number of hosts and insurance

I

companies which relied in their decision making on the guest statute, the stronger the reliance
factor. In BHA Investments, the new rule whose retroactivity was at issue prohibited cities from

~

I

imposing liquor license transfer fees as invalid in light of the legislature not having granted thein
the authority. The Court analyzed the reliance factor by looking to how many instances the City
of Boise had relied on its ordinance allowing transfer fees. Id at 320, 173. Similarly, in Baker v.

Shavers, 117 Idaho 696,791 P.2d 1275, (Idaho1990), the decision at issue "abolished the open
3Somedecisions of this Court characterize the reliance factor's query as whether courts
have relied on the earlier legal rule. But framing the question this way answers it as well: it is,
after all, the business of courts to rely on precedent. See, e.g., State v. Machen, 100 Idaho 167,
170, 595 P.2d 316,3 19 (Idaho1979) (because the prison administrative court "justifiably relied
on the existing law in this state and cannot be held to have foreseen the change in the law brought
on by [the decision at issue, the] reliance factor weighs against...retrospective application[.]";
State v. Tisdale, 103 Idaho 836, 838,654 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Idaho1982) ("Until now, our district
judges have been entitled to rely upon prior Idaho case law which did not clearly require
sentences to be supported by reasons stated of record.").

and obvious danger doctrine" whereby owners had no duty to keep their premises safe from
dangerous conditions which were known or should have been known by them. Id at 697, 1276.
In analyzing the reliance factor, the Court looked to whether "landowners may have allowed
dangerous conditions to remain on their property because they believed they had protection under
our prior decisions" and whether such reliance could have existed in light of a relevant statute.
Id at 1276-77,697-98.
In Ring, the Supreme Court held that a jury must find each fact necessary to render a
defendant eligible for a death sentence. Courts and prosecutors relied on the Idaho capital
statutory scheme which did not includejuries in sentencing proceedings in death cases before
Ring. However, a fully retroactive application of Ring would affect only a small number of cases
involving such reliance. Unlike Thompson where the Court was left to speculate on how many
hosts and insurance companies had relied on the guest statute and in Baker where it was left to
speculate whether landowners had allowed dangerous conditions to go unrepaired in reliance on
the earlier rule,, here the number of cases affected by the reliance is known to be eleven or,
possibly, t ~ e l v e . ~
4Seehttp:l/www.corr.state.id.uslfactsldeathrow.htm (Idaho Department of Corrections
website, last visited 4/9/08). There are eighteen death sentenced individuals in Idaho. Four death
sentenced individuals' sentencing (or resentencing) proceedings included juries and, therefore,
those individuals stand to gain nothing from Ring. They are Timothy Dunlap, Dale Shackelford,
Danell Payne, Erick Hall, and Azad Abdullah. Undersigned counsel notes that while the Idaho
Department of Corrections website includes Maxwell Hoffman among those now sentenced to
death, his death sentence was vacated by the federal district court. See Order Case CV 9400200-S-BLW (3113108). As well, the website incorrectly includes Richard Leavitt as a death
sentenced inmate when, in fact, the United States District Court granted him sentencing relief.
Judgment, Case CV 93-0024-S-BLW (9128107). In November, 2007, that court stayed its order
and associated matters until the State's appeal to the Ninth Circuit is complete. Thus, depending
on the outcome of Mr. Leavitt's case, a ruling that Ring applies retroactively will affect at most
12 Idaho prisoners.

The Idaho Department of Correction reports that as of July, 2002, there were four
hundred nine inmates in Idaho incarcerated for murder and manslaughter convictions. See Idaho
Department of Correction Standard Reports For March 2008 ( viewable at: http://www.idoc.-

idaho.gov/facts/monthly~statsiStandRepo~.
The eleven or twelve inmates who stand
illegally sentenced to death constitute 2.7% or 2.9% of the total number of Idaho inmates
I

incarcerated for murder and manslaughter.
Thus, while there may have been reliance on the old law, that reliance will have a

I

minimal effect on prosecutors, courts, and the Department of Corrections. Of course, even had
the reliance been greater, that should not count against retroactive application of a
constitutionally required rule. This is true, especially where, as here, the defendant has argued

i

from early on for the benefit of the rule.
3.

Effect On The Administration Of Justice Retroactive Application of
Ring.

This Court has held that, "This factor takes into account the number of cases that would
be reopened if the decision [at issue] is applied retroactively." Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19,
25,523 P.2d 1365, 1371 (Idaho1974). See Jones v. Watson, 98 Idaho 606,609,570 P.2d 284,
287 (Idaho1977) (where the decision at issue struck a statute of limitations tolling rule, the Court
noted that it was "convinced that [a] minimal number of cases will proceed to trial solely because
of a prospective application of the [decision], and thus the impact on the administration ofjustice
will be slight." Here, only eleven and at most twelve cases throughout the state would be
affected by extending full retroactive application to Ring.

As well, this Court has not shied away from retroactive application because it will add a
relatively small number of cases to the district courts' dockets. In particular, acknowledging that
the retroactive application at issue "may require the retrial of some cases[,]" the Court noted that
it was "confident that our efficient and hardworking trial judges will be able to accommodate the
relatively few cases that must be retried because of the change in the law[.]" Baker v. Shavers,
117 Idaho 696,698,791 P.2d 1275,1277 (Idaho1990).
Unlike Baker where the Court was unable to assess the number of cases retroactive
application would affect, in the case at bar that exact number is easily determined because the
individuals who stand sentenced to death in Idaho are readily identifiable. Based on this very
small number of cases at stake-eleven or twelve-,the administration of justice factor weighs
strongly in favor of retroactively applying Ring.
[[As well, this Court has the authority to prevent resentencing proceedings in those few
cases by reducing the sentences or remanding to the district courts with instructions to reduce the
sentences to the lowest sentence available to the prisoner in question. Cf. State v. Morris, 131
Idaho 263,267,954 P.2d 681,685 (Idaho1998) (district court's Rule 35 motion denial reversed,
and appellant's sentence modified to bring it within legal limits). 11

11.

BECAUSE THE RATIONALE FOR THE TEAGUE RETROACTIVITY
DOCTRINE IS GROUNDED IN FEDERALISM CONCERNS NOT AT ISSUE IN
STATE COURTS, THIS COURT SHOULD NOT SUBSTITUTE TEAGUE FOR
THE THREE-PART TEST USED BY IDAHO COURTS SINCE AT LEAST 1974.
Appellant anticipates that Respondents may urge the Court to follow the United State's

Supreme Court's lead by adopting a new standard of retroactivity, that contained in Teague v.

Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and its progeny. In Danfortk, however, the Supreme Court explained

that a state court's adoption of the Teague doctrine cannot properly be considered as following
the lead of the Supreme Court:
Justice O'Connor's opinion clearly indicates that Teague 's general
rule of nonretroactivity was an exercise ofthis Court's power to
interpret the federal habeas statute. Chapter 153 of title 28 of the
U.S. Code gives federal courts the authority to grant "writs of
habeas corpus," but leaves unresolved many important questions
about the scope of available relief. This court has interpreted that
congressional silence-along with the statute's command to dispose
ofhabeas petitions "as law and justice require," 28 U.S. 52243-as
an authorization to adjust the scope of the writ in accordance with
equitable and prudential considerations. Teague is plainly
grounded in this authority, as the opinion expressly situated the
rule it announced in this line of cases adjusting the scope of federal
habeas relief in accordance with equitable and prudential
considerations. [Id] at 308 (plurality opinion) (citing, inter alia,
Wainwright [v. Sykes, ****I and Stone [v. Powell, *** (***)I.
Since Teague is based on statutory authority that extends only to
federal courts applying a federal statute, it cannot be read as
imposing a binding obligation on state courts.
... [As well,] the text and reasoning of Justice O'Connor's
opinion also illustrate that tl~erule was meant to apply only to
federal courts considering habeas corpus petitions challenging
state-court criminal convictions. Justice O'Connor made
numerous references to the "Great writ" and the "writ," and
exoresslv state that "itlhe
. relevant frame of reference" for
determining the appropriate retroactivity rule is defined by "the
ournoses for which the writ of habeas corpus is made available."
[Teague] at 306 (plurality opinion). Moreover, she justified the
general rule of nonretroactivity in part by reference to comity and
respect for the finality of state convictions. Federalism and comity
considerations are unique to federal habeas review of state
convictions. See, e.g.,State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 45 1,475, 609
A.2d 1280, 1292 (1992) (explaining that comity and federalism
concerns "simply do not apply when this Court reviews procedural
rulings by our lower courts"). If anything, considerations of comit)
militate in favor of allowing state courts to grant habeas relief to a
broader class of individuals that is required by Teague. And while
finality is, of course, implicated in the context of state as well as
federal habeas, finality of state convictions is a state interest, not a
federal one. It is a matter that States should be free to evaluate,
and weigh the importance of, when prisoners held in state custody

-

A

.

are seeking a remedy for a violation of federal rights by their lower
courts.

....
It is thus abundantly clear that the Teague rule of
nonretroactivity was fashioned to achieve the goals of federal
habeas while minimizing federal intrusion into state criminal
proceedings. It was intended to limit the authority of federal courts
to overturn state convictions -not to limit a state court's authority
to grant relief for violations of new rules of constitutional law
when reviewing its own State's convictions.
Our subsequent cases, which characterize the Teague rule as a
standard limiting only the scope offederal habeas relief, confirm
that Teague speaks only to the context of federal habeas.

Danforth at 1040-41

111.

THIS COURT SHOULD RULE THAT IDAHO CODE §2719(5)(C)'S ANTIRETROACTIVITY PROVISION HAS NO APPLICATION HERE.
Mr. Stuart acknowledges that Idaho Code Section 19-2719 provides that, "A successive

post-conviction pleading asserting the exception shall be deemed facially insufficient to the
extent it seeks retroactive application of new rules of law." Id at 19-2719(5)(c). Mr. Stuart
nevertheless seeks post-conviction relief through the retroactive application of Ring. He
contends that Section 2719(5)(c) may not properly preclude successive post-conviction petitions.
There are four reasons for this. First, Section 19-2719(5)(c) violates the Idaho
Constitution's separation of power requirement. Second, Idaho law prohibits retroactively
I

applying that Section 19-2719(5)(c) section, to this case. Third, that statutory provision's
application in the instant case would violate the United States Constitution's Supremacy Clause.
Fourth, equity requires granting relief to Mr. Stuart.

A.

Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) violates the Idaho Constitution separation
of powers requirement.

Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5) provides:
(5) If the defendant fails to apply for relief as provided in this
section and within the time limits specified. . . [t]he courts of
Idaho shall have no power to consider any such claims[.]
(a) An allegation that a successive post-conviction petition may be
heard because of the applicability of the exception for issues that
were not known or could not reasonably have been known shall not
be considered unless the applicant [meets certain other enumerated
requirements].

(c) A successive post-conviction pleading asserting the exception
shall be deemed facially insufficient to the extent it seeks
retroactive application of new rules of law.

I.C. $19-2719(5). This provision plainly aims to limit the jurisdiction of district courts.
However, legislative efforts to restrict the district court's jurisdiction violate the Idaho
Constitution.
The Idaho Constitution, Article V, Section 20, confers original jurisdiction on the district
court to hear all cases. Idaho Constitution, Article 11, Section 1, mandates that the powers of the
three governmental branches remain separate, and, more particularly, Article V, Section 13,
specifically prohibits legislative restriction of judicial jurisdiction:
The legislature shall have no power to deprive the judicial
department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it
as a coordinate department of the government; but the legislature
shall provide a proper system of appeals, and regulate by law,
when necessary, the methods of proceeding in the exercise of their
powers of all the courts below the Supreme Court, sofar as the
same may be done without conflict with the Constitution[.]

Id. (italics added). Of course, as the Supreme Court has long held, a Section 19-2719 petition "is
a proceeding entirely new and independent from the criminal action which led to the conviction."

Paradis v. Slate, 110 Idaho 534,636,716 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Idaho1986). Thus, Article V, $ 1 3 ' ~
reservation of power to the legislature has no application to Section 19-2719 proceedings since
they are not appeals.
The court below noted that anti-retroactivity provision "merely. . .provides for the filing
of a petition outside the time limit if a petitioner can show certain circumstances exist to merit a
late filing." Memorandum Opinion On Petition For Post Conviction Relief And/or Writ Of

Habeas Corpus And Motion To Correct Illegal Sentence, To Vacate Sentence Of Death And For
New Sentencing Trial ("Memorandum Opinion") at 14-15, After suggesting that 2719(5)(c) one
of the conditions which must be met for filing outside the time limit, that court asserted without
argument or citation to authority in its favor that the anti-retroactivity provision is "analogous to
statutes of limitations, time limits for appeals, as well as other time limits established by statute
or court rule." Memorandum Opinion at 15. It concludes that, "[tlherefore, I.C. $ 2719 does not
violate the separation of powers doctrine found in the Idaho Constitution." Memorandum

Opinion at 15.
The sole case relied on by the court below, Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Center,
134 Idaho 464,4 P.3d 1115 (Idaho 2000), is inapposite. At issue there was a statutory reduction
in allowable jury awards of damages. The Court rejected the argument that a reduction in
allowable awards infringed on the judiciary's traditional power of remittitur, finding that the
statute did not limit "the exercise of the judiciary's constitutional powers or jurisdiction. Rather,
if anything, the statute is a limitation on the rights of plaintiffs, not the judiciary." Id. at 471,

1122. In stark contrast, Section 2719(5)(c) provides that courts "shall. . .deem[] facially
insufficient [any successive petition] to the extent it seeks retroactive application of new rules of
law." There is an obvious differences between a statutory cap on damage awards such as was at
issue in Kirkland and the utter preclusion of a cause of action as is found in Section 2719(5)(c).
The Kirkland statute limits the amount of an award, whereas, far from limiting relief, Section
2719(5)(c) precludes it altogether by mandating a dismissal for facial insufficiency in the first
instance
Additionally, Kirkland cannot account for the constitutional guarantee that the "writ of
habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety
requires it, and then only in such manner as shall be prescribed by law." Idaho Const. art. I, $5.
In Kirkland, the Court nowhere addressed the interplay between the legislature's power to limit
remedies available to plaintiffs and nay constitutional rights vested in plaintiffs. By stark
contrast, Petitioner is constitutionally guaranteed the right to seek a writ of habeas corpus and
Idaho courts hold that this remedy may now be sought only through the vehicle of a
postconviction petition. This means that the legislature's prerogative to limit remedies in the
postconviction context is not without constraint. Rather, the limits may not suspend the writ.
The fact that district courts did reach the merits of habeas claims filed outside the Section 192719 time restrictions, demonstrates that the statute suspends the writ in violation of the
constitutional guarantee. Mahaffey v. State, 87 Idaho 228, 229-30,392 P.2d 279 (Idaho1964)
(reversing district court dismissal of successive habeas petition brought ten years after
conviction). In short, while the legislature's express streamlining purpose in enacting Section

19-2719 may have been permissible, its chosen means violated the separation of powers
constitutional requirement.
It is Section 19-2719(5)(c)'s removing district court jurisdiction to even consider
postconviction claims seeking retroactive application of new rules of law which violates the

I
I

Idaho Constitution's separation of power mandate. This Court has rejected similar past
legislative efforts to restrict the judiciary's jurisdiction. In State v. Interest of Lindsey, 78 Idaho

I

241,246,300 P.2d 491,494 (Idaho1956), the Idaho Supreme Court struck a statute purporting to
I

transform previously criminal matters of juveniles into civil matters because '"tlhe legislature, by
denoting as a civil matter what the law has previously regarded as a felony, attempt[ed] to take

I

away jurisdiction vested in the district court by the constitution itself, and . . . attempted to render

I
I

that court powerless to do anything about the prosecution of such persons." Similarly, in Boise

City v. Better Homes, Inc., 72 Idaho 441,444-45,243 P.2d 303,304 (Idaho1952), the Supreme

I

Court held that "[tlhe original jurisdiction conferred upon the district court by the constitution,

Art.5, $20, cannot be diminished by the legislature. Const.Art. 5, §13[.JS Again, in Clernons v.
Kinsley, 72 Idaho 251,256-57,239 P.2d 266,269 (Idaho1951), the Court held that "[tlhe broad
jurisdiction [created by Art. 5, $131 is not subject to diminution by legislative act.". The Court
held the same thing in Robinson v. Robinson, 70 Idaho 122, 127,212 P.2d 1031, 1033-34
(Idaho1949). Finally, in McKnight v. Grant, 13 Idaho 629,637,92 P. 989,990 (Idaho1907), the
Court held that, "We think [art. 5, $131 was . . . intended to preserve to the judicial department of
the state government the right and power to finally determine controversies between parties
involving their rights and upon whose claims some decision or judgment must be rendered or
determination made." In short, the Idaho Supreme Court has consistently and long held that the
I

legislature may not directly or otherwise restrict the district court's jurisdiction. Consequently,
Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) cannot stand as a bar to granting Ring full retroactive
application.

B.

Idaho law prohibits retroactively applying Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c).

It is long settled "that an amendment to an existing statute will not, absent an express
legislative statement to the contrary, be held to be retroactive in application. Johnson v.

Stoddard, 96 Idaho 230,526 P.2d 835 (1974)[.Ix Nebeker v. Piper Aircraft Corporation, 113
Idaho 609,614,747 P.2d 18,23 (Idaho 1987)(citationsomitted) (emphasis added). See Idaho
Code Section 73-101 ("No part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless expressly so
declared.") The lower court's rejection of this claim was based on the fact that when Section 192719 was enacted in 1984, the legislature included in the session law language making it
retroactive. Mr. Stuart does not claim otherwise. Rather, he contends that because the legislature
did not include similar express retroactivity language when amending subsection (c) into Section
19-2719(5), Idaho code Section 73-101 precludes Section 19-2719(5)(c)'s retroactive application
to the instant case.
Though the instant petition was filed after Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5) was amended
to include subsection (c)~,applying that statutory provision in this case would constitute a
retroactive application. Paradis v. State, 128 Idaho 223, 912 P.2d 110 (Idaho 1996), illustrates
why. There, the lower court applied a statute enacted after the trial and direct appeal were
concluded. The Supreme Court held that the statute's application was prospective, not
retroactive, because (I) the statute changed postconviction procedures and did not materially

SSubsection(c) was amended into Section 19-2719(5) in 1995,

affect any substantive rights of the appellant and (2) "the statutory limitations period [for filing
the postconviction petition] had not yet run." Id. at 227, 114.
The statutory provision at issue in this case stands in dramatic contrast to the one at issue
in Paradis. In particular, Paradis merely prescribed a procedural requirement available to every
I

postconviction petitioner-that the petition be filed within a statutorily specified time. Far from
prescribing a procedure available to all seeking relief, Idaho Code Section § 19-2719(5)(c)
purports to raise an absolute bar to relief on any claim based on the retroactive application of a
new rule of law. The distinction is critical. The procedural requirement at issue in Paradis
affected no substantive rights because all postconviction petitioners could comply with it. By
contrast, Section 19-2719(5)(c) does not create mere procedural requirements. Rather, it
precludes an entire class of substantive claims, leaving postconviction petitioners with no
mechanism by which to assert those claims. Put another way, Section 19-2719(5) does not
I

merely "affect" this class of substantive rights, it purports to destroy them. For this same reason,

I
the second ground for the Paradis court's holding has no application here. Consequently,
applying Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) to Mr. Stuart would constitute a retroactive
application.
Federal courts have noted that this same question may arise with regard to the
Antiterrorism And Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). While the United States
Supreme Court has held that, as a general rule, AEDPA applies to petitions filed after the act's
enactment, it has also noted that specific AEDPA provisions may not be applied if doing so
would have a retroactive effect. Lindh v Murphy, 521 U.S. 320,327-28 (1997). As the Fourth
Circuit concluded:

We agree with petitioner and those courts that having had cause to consider the
question in full, have concluded that the Supreme court did not hold in Lindh that
courts are necessarily to apply the new provisions of chapter 153 to all habeas
petitions filed after April 24, 1996 [i.e.- AEDPA's enactment date]. More
particularly, we hold that Lindh did not foreclose-and indeed contemplatedcontinuing resort to Landgraf [i.e.-retroactivity of statutes] analysis in order to
ensure that application of chapter 153's new provisions is not impermissibly
retroactive in such cases.
I

Mueller v. Angelone, 181 F.3d 557, 567 (41hCir. 1999)(citing to In re Hansard, 123 F.3d 922,

i
I

933 n.22 (6' Cir. 1997), and citing to In re Minarik, 166 F.3d 591 (3'd Cir. 1999), and Brown v.

Angelone, 150 F.3d 370 (41hCir. 1998)). See Scott v. Boos, 215 F.3d 940, 949 (9thCir.
2000)(federal prohibition against retroactive application of statute absent clear Congressional
statement of intent looks to "parties' actions, not the date of filing").
Though Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) expressly purports to absolutely bar
postconviction petitioners' claims dependent on retroactively applying a new rule of law, it

I

contains no express legislative statement that it should itself be retroactively applied. It cannot,
then, be applied to the case at bar.
C.

Idaho Code Section 19-2519(5)(c)'violatesPetitioner's rights to due process
and equal protection guaranteed under the United States and Idaho
Constitutions.

If Mr. Stuart did not stand under sentence of death, Idaho Code $19-2719(5)(c)'s antiretroactivity provision would not apply.6 "I.C. 519-2719 does not eliminate the applicability of

%rider the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act ("UPCPA"), "post-conviction relief
is not barred where new evidence is discovered, or where later case law suggests a conviction is
unlawful." Aragon v. Stafe, 114 Idaho 758,766 n. 12, 760 P.2d, 1174, 1182 n. 12 (Idaho 1988)
(citing I.C.5 19-4901) (emphasis added). Also, under the UPCPA, I.C. 5 19-4908, a claim can
only be waived ifthe waiver is knowing, voluntary and intelligent. McKinney v. Stafe, 133 Idaho
695,700-01,922 P.2d 144, 149-50 (Idaho 1999). As noted in the text, to the extent that Idaho
Code Section 19-2719 conflicts with the UPCPA, the Section 19-2719 provision governs.

the UPCPA to capital cases, but it supersedes the UPCPA to the extent that their provisions
conflict." McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695,700,992 P.2d 144, 149 (Idaho 1999). Because of
this difference, LC. $19-2719(5)(c) violates Mr. Stuart's due process and equal protection rights.
The court below addressed this argument in part only. It ignored his claim that because a
fundamental right-the right to a jury trial-is at issue here, in determining whether Idaho's
statutory postconviction scheme violates Petitioner's right to due process and equal protection by
making available different mechanism for enforcing fundamental rights depending on whether
the petitioner stands sentenced to death, the courts must employ strict scrutiny. See Van

Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 126, 15 P.3d 1129, 1134 (Idaho 2000)
(if a fundamental right is at issue, appropriate standard of review of law infringing on that right is
strict scrutiny); Newlan v. State, 96 Idaho 711,714,535 P.2d 1348, 1351 (Idaho 1975) (strict
scrutiny when statute's classification infringes upon a fundamental right); State v. Breed, 111
Idaho 497, 500, 725 P.2d 202,205 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986) (strict scrutiny of statutory schemes
that infringe upon a "'fundamental right' such as voting, procreation, or constitutional safeguards
for persons accused of crimes"). See generally Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise
On Constitutional Law 5 18.41 at 800-01(3'~ed. 1999) ("When the government takes actions that
burden the rights of a classification of persons in terms of their treatment in a criminal justice
system it is proper to review these laws under the strict scrutiny standard for equal protection.")
To the extent Idaho Code Section19-2719(5)(c) is construed to preclude review of
petitioner's claims, the statute is unconstitutional. It would violate Mr. Stuart's rights to equal
protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
and Article 1, Sections 2 and 13 of the Idaho Constitution, in that there is no rational basis, for

the disparate treatment of non-capital prisoners who do not need to demonstrate the "heightened
burden" for postconviction relief which capital petitioners must meet, e.g., Paz v. State, 123
Idaho 758,760,852 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Idaho 1993), or meet the limitations imposed by LC. 5 192719(5), see, e.g., Sivakv. State, 134 Idaho 641,648-49,s P.3d 636,643-44 (Idaho 2000);

Pizzuto v. State, 134 Idaho 793,796-97,lO P.3d 742,745-46 (Idaho 1995). Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620,631-36 (1995); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,446-51
(1985); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55,61-63 (1982); U.S.D.A. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,535
(1973); Sterling H. Nelson & Sons, Inc. v. Bender, 95 Idaho 813,815-16,520 P.2d 860,861-62
(Idaho 1974).
Idaho's disparate treatment of capital as compared to non-capital postconviction
petitioners fails under a rational basis analysis. Necessarily, then, it fails under strict scrutiny
analysis, too. "A law which infringes on a hndamental right will be upheld only where the State
can demonstrate the law is necessary to promote a compelling state interest." Id. The state's
interest in expeditious handling of capital cases, the purpose of the offending provision, Idaho
Code Section 19-2719(5)(c), is not a sufficiently compelling interest to justifl the violation of
petitioner's fundamental right to trial by jury.
Finally, I.C. $19-2719(5) is unconstitutionally vague. First, the statute imposes an
internally inconsistent standard of "known" or "should reasonably have known," in subsection
(5) versus a standard of reasonably "could" have been known in subsection @)(a). I.C. 5 192515(5)(a). There is little question that "should" have known imposes a less stringent standard
on a petitioner than "could have known." The internally inconsistent standards make application
of the statute unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999)(statute

"may be impermissibly vague because it fails to establish standards for the police and public that
are sufficient to guard against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty interests. Kolender v Lawson,
461 U.S. 352,358,103 S.Ct. 1855,75 L.Ed.2d903 (1983)").
It is impossible to glean from the statute or case law regarding 19-2719 waiver standard
I

exactly what "should reasonably have known" requires. Within the concept of "reasonably
should have known" is a requirement of at least minimal understanding, and familiarity with

I

claims subject to bar.
I

Even under an objective standard, the requirement of "reasonableness" put the question of
default beyond a strict liability mandate that the State seeks to have applied and thus subject to
hearing, argument, and appellate review. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not the
types of claim that are familiar to the average lay person -they are defined and identified only if
the party observing the performance (or lack thereof) has legal knowledge in the area under

I

question.

D.

Applying Idaho Code $19-2719(5)(c) would violate the state and federal
constitutional prohibitions against expost facto laws.

Petitioner seeks relief from a 1982 death sentence. Idaho Code Section 19-2719 did not
yet exist. That statute was first enacted in 1984. The state and federal constitutions each prohibit

ex post facto laws. U.S.Const. art. I, 5 10, cl. 1. Idaho Const. art. I, 5 16. Applying a law enacted
after the commission of the crime to "make more burdensome the punishment" violates the ex

post facto clause. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37,52 (1990). For example, in Garner v.
Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (2000), the United States Supreme Court held that increasing the interval
between parole reconsiderations may violate the expost facto clause. Whether it does depends,

the Court held, on whether the change "creates a significant risk" of making the punishment
more burdensome -there, by prolonging the respondent's incarceration.
The court below rejected this argument, further explicated below, apparently on the
ground that Section 19-2719(5)(c) does not increase the punishment for criminal acts because,
i
I

I

the argument seems to go, Petitioner's sentence is not increased.
While Section 19-2719's provisions may appear at first glance to implicate none of the
categories of laws which violate the expostfacto prohibition, neither did the statute struck down
in Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1980). There, the challenged statute removed "gain time for
good conduct" granted to prison inmates. Id. at 25. The state argued that the revised statute
could not run afoul of the expost facto clause because it was "'no part of the original sentence

1

Ii
I

and thus no part of the punishment annexed to the crime at the time petitioner was sentenced."'
Id. at 3 1 (quoting State's brie9. The Court rejected this argument, noting, first, that "we need not
detemline whether the prospect of the gain time was in some technical sense part of the sentence
to conclude that it in fact is one determinant of petitioner's prison term-and that his effective

I

sentence is altered once this determinant is changed' and, second, that "we have held that a statue
may be retrospective even if it alters punitive conditions outside the sentence." Thus, a statute
may sufficiently affect a sentence so as to violate the expost facto prohibition even though it
constitutes no part of the imposed sentence. As the Supreme Court noted in California

Department ofCorrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 (1995), "We have previously declined to
articulate a single 'formula' for identifying those legislative changes that have a sufficient effect
on substantive crimes or punishments to fall within the constitutional prohibition, and we have
no occasion to do so here." Id at 509 (citation omitted). Instead, the test for determining

whether a change in law violates the expost facto prohibition is whether the change "created 'a
sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes.'

[Morales, 514 U.S.] at 509." Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (2000).
The Garner test, however, does more than clarify whether a law which was no part of the
im posed sentence violates the expostfacto prohibition. It also serves to distinguish those
procedural changes which constitute expost facto violations and those which do not. The court
below appears to reject Mr. Stuart's claim on the ground that Section 19-2719 is procedural in
nature. Applying the Garner test demonstrates that the procedural changes enacted by Section
19-2719 run afoul of the expost facto clause.
Applying Sections 19-2719(3) & (5) to Mr. Stuart's case would unquestionably create a
significant risk of making his sentence more burdensome than if the UPCPA were applied. For
while those statutory sections contemplate barring claims not raised within 42 days of the filing
of the judgment regardless of petitioner's mental state in relation to those claims and their
waiver, under the UPCPA a petitioner's delay in asserting claims may be deemed a waiver only if
he knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived the claims. I.C. 919-4808. As this Court has
held:
In capital cases, a successive petition is allowed only where the
petitioner can demonstrate that the issues raised were not known or
could not reasonably have been known within the 42-day time
frame. This is in contrast with the UPCPA, which requires waiver
to be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. LC. 919-4908.

McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695,701,992 P.2d 144,150 (Idaho1999). Because the Section 194908 hurdle is significantly lower for petitioners than the Section 19-2719 hurdle, it is more
likely that. the Court would reach the merits of Mr. Stuart's claims if he were required to clear the

former and not the latter. This was, of course, the Idaho legislature's expressed purpose in
enacting Section 19-2719, as is clear form the contrast between the statute and Section 19-4908,

McKinney, as well as the legislature's explicitly described purpose. LC. $19-2719 ("The
following special procedures shall be interpreted to accomplish the purpose of eliminating

unnecessary delay in carrying out a valid death sentence.") (italics added). Further, Mr. Stuart's
claims are remarkably strong. The relative strength of his claims shows that Mr. Stuart would
likely prevail on their merits and thus obtain a reduced sentence andlor vacation of his
conviction. Thus, not only does the statutory change and purpose in enacting Section 19-2719
allow an inference that the change created "a sufficient high risk of increasing the measure of
punishment attached to the covered crimes" such that it violates the expostfacto clause, the facts
I
I

of the instant case compel it. Garner, 529 U.S. at 250. Because death is a more burdensome
penalty than life,ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,411 (1986) (plurality opinion) ("execution is
the most irremediable and unfathomable of penalties; . . .death is different."), applying Section

I

i

!

19-2719 to block a merits review of Mr. Stuart's ineffective assistance of counsel claims
constitutes an expostfacto violation.
Conclusion
For all these reasons, Idaho Code $19-2719(5)(c)'s prohibition against retroactively
applying new rules should not bar Mr. Stuart's claims.

IV.

IDAHO CODE $19-2719(5)'s UNTIMELY CLAIMS BAR HAS NO
APPLICATION HERE.
Though the court below did not address Respondent's argument that Mr. Stuart's claims

are not only barred by Idaho Code Section 19-2719's anti-retroactivity provisions, but that they
I

are barred by that statute's current prohibition against claims which were known or reasonably
should have been known but were not raised in a timely filed initial postconviction petition. Id. at
I

I

(5). Specifically, Respondent argues that because Mr. Stuart claimed on direct appeal that his
sentencing proceedings were constitutionally defective, he "knew" that claim for Idaho Code
Section 19-2719(5) purposes, failed to raise it in his first postconviction petition, and thereby

I

I

waived it. See Bricf In Support Of Motion For Summary Dismissal at 6-7. Respondent makes
this argument even as it concedes that the Idaho Supreme Court considered and rejected the

I

claim on Mr. Stuart's direct appeal and considered such claims "routinely" in other cases. Id In
short, the State contends that because Mr. Stuart did not frivolously re-raise the already rejected
claim in his first postconviction petition, Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5) bars him from raising it
now -his first and earliest opportunity to raise it after the United States Supreme Court clarified
in Ring that whether aggravating circumstances exist is a jury question in capital schemes like
Idaho's.
As a matter of constitutional law, Respondent's position fails for several reasons. First,
Idaho Code Section 19-4901(a) prohibited Mr. Stuart from relitigating in postconviction claims
already considered on direct appeal. Second, Respondent's interpretation of Idaho Code Section
19-2719(5) leads to absurd results and cannot, therefore, be employed to preclude the instant
claim. Third, the amended provision on which Respondent relies, Idaho Code Section 192719(5), cannot be retroactively applied to the instant case. Fourth, Idaho Code Section 928

2719(5) violates the Idaho Constitution's separation of powers mandate. Fifth, the provision
violates the United States Constitution's prohibition against expost facto laws. Sixth, the
provision violates Mr. Stuart's rights to due process and equal protection as guaranteed by the
United States and Idaho constitutions.

A.

Idaho Code Section 4901(a) Prohibits Relitigating In Postconviction
Proceedings Claims Already Addressed On Direct Appeal.

Settled Idaho law prohibits relitigating in postconviction proceedings claims already
addressed on direct appeal. Sivak v. State,143 Idaho 641,647, 8 P.3d 636, 642 (Idaho
2002)(exception exists to general prohibition against post-conviction claim already litigated
where previously unavailable evidence supports the claim); Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 534,537,
716 P.2d 1306, 1310 (Idaho 1986)(Idaho Code Section 19-4901 precludes claims based on
material facts previously presented and heard); Parsons v. State, 113 Idaho 421,425,745 P.2d
300,304 (Ct.App. 1987)(cIaims which were raised on direct appeal may not be raised in
postconviction unless based on material facts not previously available); and LC. $19-4901(a)(4)
(claims rejected on direct appeal may not be relitigatcd in postconviction proceedings unless
"there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires
vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice")(italics added); and LC. 5 194901(b) (making plain that claims rejected on direct appeal may not be relitigated absent new
supporting facts: "This remedy is not a substitute for . . . any appeal from the sentence or
conviction.").
Respondent concedes that the Idaho Supreme Court considered and rejected Mr. Stuart's
claim on direct appeal. See Brief in Support Of Motion For Summary Dismissal at 6-7.
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Respondent's contention, then, that Mr. Stuart should have raised the same claim with no new
legal or historical supporting facts contradicts settled Idaho law.7

B.

The State's Interpretation Of Seetion 19-2719(5) Fails Because It Leads To
"Absurd" Results.

The State asserts that Section 19-2719(5) bars Mr. Stuart's claim because he did not raise
it in earlier postconviction proceedings. If the State's gloss is correct, Section 19-2719precludes
Idaho courts from ever correcting an erroneous decision after the judgment is final. This

I

interpretation is plainly contrary to the legislature's express intent and its directive to interpret the
!

statute so that its purpose is accomplished: "The following special procedures shall be interpreted
to accomplish the purpose of eliminating unnecessary delay in carrying out a valid death

I

sentence." LC. $19-2719 (italics added). By preventing courts from correcting their earlier
I

mistakes, the State's proposed construction would expedite canying out invalid death sentences.
Consequently, the Court should reject the State's proposed construction.
It is true, of course, that Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5) currently provides that a
defendant "waive[s] . . . claims for relief as were known or reasonably should have been known"
within the time in which the statute allows for filing an initial postconviction petition. The State
correctly notes that Mr. Stuart was aware of his claim but did not raise it in his initial
postconviction petition. It further argues that to have preserved the opportunity to raise his claim
in a successive postconviction petition, Mr. Stuart should have raised it in his initial petition.

I

7Further,even had Mr. Stuart earlier raised the claim in postconviction proceedings, there
is every reason to believe that the Idaho Supreme Court would have rejected it like it had and
continued to in all the other cases raising the claim until Ring and Fetterly.

Yet, as the State concedes, the Idaho Supreme Court had already denied direct appeal relief on
that claim. Consequently, on the State's interpretation, to preserve an opportunity to raise his
claim in successive postconviction proceedings, Mr. Stuart was required to raise a frivolous
claim in his initial postconviction petition. See I.R.C.P. 1l(a)(l) ("The signature of an attorney

1

. . . constitutes a certificate that ...the pleading, motion or other paper . . . is warranted by existing

I

law or good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law[.] If a
pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court upon motion or upon

I
I

its own initiative, shall impose...an appropriate sanction."); McKinney v. State, 992 P.2d 144,
148, 133 Idaho 695,699 (Idaho 1999)(state moved for sanctions for filing of allegedly frivolous

I

pleading). The State's proposed construction is, therefore, absurd and must be rejected. Cf:

Gavica v. Hanson, 101 Idaho 58,60,608 P.2d 861,863 (Idaho 1980)("In effectuating the
I

legislative intent behind an ambiguous statute, the Court should, if possible, avoid indulging in a
statutory construction which would cause absurd or unduly harsh results.").
The State argues by analogy to Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417,825 P.2d 1073, reh'g
denied (Idaho1992), that Idaho Code Section 19-2719 purports to preclude Idaho district courts
from ever considering whether, in a case whose judgment is final, one of their earlier rulings was
legally mistaken in light of recent clarifying and higher court authority on point. In Fetterly, the
appellant argued that his claim was not known and could not have been known when he filed his
initial postconviction petition. The Supreme Court said in dicta that appellant waived his claim
because he failed to raise it in his first postconviction petition even though it had been reasonably
knowable immediately after trial and could have been raised in that earlier petition.
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Even were the Fetterly dicta a holding, it would have no application here. As the State
points out, Mr. Stuart raised the claim but was denied relief on direct appeal. See Brief In
Support of Motion for Summary Dismissal at 6-7. Thus, far from waiving the claim, Mr. Stuart
timely raised it and the Supreme Court considered and denied it on the merits. See State v.
Stuart, 110 Idaho 163, 175,715 P.2d 833,845, reh'g denied (Idaho 1985). Idaho law precluded
his relitigating the claim absent new material facts. Supra at 40-41. Until this past summer's

Ring and Fetterly decisions, then, Idaho law precluded Mr. Stuart from relitigating his
constitutionally defective sentencing proceedings claim. Id.
By contrast, in the 1992 Fetterly decision on which Respondent relies, the appellant
waived his claim which was reasonabty knowable immediately aRer trial by failing to raise it on
direct appeal or in his initial postconviction petition. There, the appellant raised his claim for the
first time in a successive postconviction petition. In light of this difference in procedural posture,
Fetterly is inapposite.
The State's interpretation of Idaho Code Section 19-2719 is wrong not only because it (1)
requires a postconviction petitioner to violate the Idaho prohibition against postconviction
petitioners relitigating claims raised and decided on direct appeal and (2) leads ineluctably to
absurd results, but also because (3) it so obviously fails to capture the legislature's intent to
create expedited procedural mechanisms to carry out only valid death sentences. See I.C. $192719 (purpose is to eliminate "unnecessary delay in carrying out a valid death sentencen)(italics
added). Arguably, of course, death sentences may be valid for Idaho Code Section 19-2719
purposes even though imposed on the basis of constitutional errors, for defendants may fail to
timely object and, thereby, waive their right to relief. But the legislature could not have intended

to require that in order to preserve the right to later raise claims should the courts at some futwe
time acknowledge earlier legal errors, a postconviction petitioner must raise those claims in their
initial petitions even though the courts must then dismiss them as previously raised and decided.
For this extraordinarily narrow set of claims, then, Idaho Code Section 19-2719 waiver
provisions have no application. Mr. Stuart raises just such a claim here.

C.

Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)'s Bar Against Claims Already Known Or
Which Should Reasonably Have Been Known Cannot Be Retroactively
Applied Here.

For the same reasons that Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)'s anti-retroactivity provision
cannot be retroactively applied, its "known, or reasonably should have been known" provision
cannot be retroactively applied. See supra at 23-25, incorporated herein. It is long settled "that
an amendment to an existing statute will not, absent an express legislative statement to the
contrary, be held to be retroactive in application. Johnson v. Stoddard, 96 Idaho 230,526 P.2d
835 (1974)[.In Nebeker v. Piper Aircraft Corporation, 113 Idaho 609,614,747 P.2d 18,23
(Idaho 1987)(citations omitted). See Idaho Code Section 73-101 ("No part of these compiled
laws is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.") The amendment to Idaho Code Section 192719(5) adopting the bar to claims which were "known, or reasonably should have been known"
when a timely initial postconviction petition was or should have been filed contains no express
legislative statement that it should itself be retroactively applied. It cannot, then, be applied to
the case at bar.

D.

Idaho Code Section 19-2719 Invades the Judiciary's Province, In Violation
Of The Idaho Constitution's Separation Of Powers Requirement.

The State asserts that Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5) bars Mr. Stuart's claim because he
did not raise it in earlier postconviction proceedings. That statute provides that if a petitioner
"fails to apply for relief. . . within the time limits specified, . . . [tlhe courts of Idaho shall have
no power to consider any such claims for relie@.]" I.C. $19-2719(5). This violates the Idaho
Constitution's separation of powers requirement by limiting the constitutionally defined original
jurisdiction of the district court.

E.

Applying Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5) Would Violate The State And
Federal Provisions Against Ex Post Facto Laws.

Petitioner seeks relief from sentences for his 1982 convictions. Applying Idaho Code
Section 19-2719(5)'s time limitations provision to this case would violates the federal and state
constitutional prohibitions against expost facto laws for the same reasons that applying Section
19-2719(5)'s anti-retroactivity provisions would.

F.

Idaho Code Section 19-2519(5) Violates Petitioner's Rights To Due Process
And Equal Protection Guaranteed Under The United States And Idaho
Constitutions.

If Mr. Stuart did not stand under sentence of death, Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)'s time
limitations bar would not apply. Applying this provision to Mr. Stuart's case would violate his
due process and equal protection rights as guaranteed by the United States Constitution and Idaho
Constitution for the same reasons that applying Section 19-2719(5)'s anti-retroactivity provision
would. See supva, at 33-35, incorporated herein.

Additionally, to preclude Mr. Stuart's claims would violate his state and federal
constitutional rights to equal protection inasmuch it would deny him the ability to obtain relief
for the violation of his constitutional rights solely because his judgment is final. See, e.g.,James

Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529,540 (1991) ("there remains even now the
disparate treatment of those cases that come to the Court directly and those that come here in
collateral proceedings").

IV.

THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER CLAIMS BROUGHT BY
MR. STUART PURSUANT TO HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO HABEAS
CORIPUS.
Mr. Stuart styled his August 2,2002, petition in the instant matter as "Petition For Post-

Conviction Relief And/or Writ Of Habeas Corpus." Though the court below did not address it,
Respondent argued that the court was without jurisdiction to consider Mr. Stuart's claims as
habeas claims because Idaho Code Section 19-4202 does not invest district courts with
jurisdiction to consider petitions for writ of habeas corpus. Because Section 19-4202 has no
application in the instant matter, Respondent's argument fails.
Section 19-4202 is part of the Idaho Habeas Corpus and Institutional Litigation
Procedures Act ("Act"). I.C. 5519-4201 - 19-4226. That Act expressly excludes from its scope
the precise kind of claims Mr. Stuart asserts, viz, those brought via a petition of habeas corpus
"as a substitute for, or in addition to, . . . . proceedings under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 or the
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act, chapter 49, title 19[.In I.C. $19-4203(4). Also, the
legislature enumerated the kind of individuals who may bring claims pursuant to the Act as well
as the sorts of claims covered by the Act. Neither list covers Mr. Stuart or his claims. Finally,
the UPCPA "comprehends and takes the place of all other common law, statutory, or other

remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of the conviction of sentence." I.C.
$19-4901(b). Consequently, Respondent's reliance on Idaho Code Section 19-4202 is misplaced
and its argument that this Court is without jurisdiction to consider Mr. Stuart's claims for a writ
of habeas corpus fails.
Of course, the Section 19-4901(b) language quoted in the last paragraph suggests that Mr.
Stuart's claims for a writ of habeas corpus may be permitted only as claims for UPCPA relief.
This interpretation fails to capture the important difference between writs of habeas corpus
petitions and UPCPA relief. Whereas writs of habeas corpus are constitutionally guaranteed
(Idaho Const., art. I, §5), the UPCPA petition is a statutory creature. I.C. §§ 19-4901 & 2719.
Consequently, Section 19-4901(b)'s provision that the UPCPA takes the place of all other
previously available mechanisms for challenging the validity of convictions and sentences is
valid only to the extent that the UPCPA does not in any way suspend the writ of habeas corpus.
Statutes which do not conform to constitutional requirements are invalid. Idaho Schools For

Equal Educational Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573,583,850 P.2d 724, 734, reh'g denied
(Idaho1993)(allowing other branches of government "to interpret the constitution for us . . .
would be an abject abdication of our role in the American system of government"). Therefore, to
the extent that the UPCPA does suspend the writ of habeas corpus, it is constitutionally deficient
and may not be enforced. Id.
The Idaho Constitution, Article I, Section 5, provides:
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended,
unless in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it,
and then only in such manner as shall be prescribed by law.

The privilege to the writ of habeas corpus is guaranteed without any provision for possible
waiver by potential claimants. Idaho Code Section 19-2719's waiver provisions, therefore, have
no application to habeas claims.
For these reasons, if this Court does not reach Mr. Stuart's claims for UPCPA relief, it
must reach them for writ of habeas corpus relief.

CONCLUSION
For all of these reasons, this case should be remanded for Ring to be applied to
Petitioner's case in the court below.
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